Abstract: A novel method composed of phase retrieval is proposed to precisely recover the phase distribution in the double random phase encoding system. The model of a point light source is employed to illuminate the system, in the output side of which several diffracted intensity patterns are recorded in an orderly way. The phase at the output plane of the system is calculated by a parallel iterative phase retrieval algorithm with the recorded images. With the help of the reconstructed phase, the two phase masks can be determined by inverse Fourier transform. As a kind of chosen-plaintext attack, the secret image with high quality can be recovered with the proposed method.
Introduction
The optical information security technique has been developed for the protection of secret image or 2-D data, since the double random phase encoding (DRPE) [1] was proposed by Refregier and Javidi in 1995. The DRPE is a typical and basic method of optical encryption. In the phase encoding methods composed of optical system [1] - [6] , the secret image encoded in amplitude or phase is randomized uniformly. In the aspect of security, the second phase mask in DRPE [1] - [3] serves as the main key and includes a lot of individual random data. In the cascaded structure of phase encoding [7] , some random phase masks are introduced for security enhancement.
The security of DRPE has been queried by known-plaintext attack (KPA) [8] and chosenplaintext attack (CPA) [9] . If a pair of secret image and encrypted image is obtained by an illegal user, the DRPE is flimsy for the KPA composed of iterative phase retrieval algorithm. The CPA [9] employs the system of DRPE to generate the output patterns of a series of 2-D impulse functions located at the input plane. By combining the patterns, the estimated value of phase key of DRPE can be calculated directly. Experimentally the CPA, however, requires a lot of work to record the phase and intensity in the encryption output plane.
Our motivation is to reduce the experimental operations of the CPA scheme and enhance the quality of recovered image. In this paper, a simple and effective method is presented to attack DRPE in Fourier domains. Here the utilized optical elements contain a point light source, a pupil and a CCD. When the point source in input plane of DRPE structure is used for illuminating the system, a CCD is used to record several diffracted intensity patterns at the output plane and the planes, which are placed along the optical axis and outside the DRPE system. By using the patterns, a parallel iterative phase retrieval algorithm in Fresnel domains is designed for solving the phase distribution at the output plane of the encryption system. By taking an inverse Fourier transform of the reconstructed complex amplitude function, the data of the second phase mask with very small error is calculated. This scheme is named as the point light source attack (PLSA). Moreover the phase distribution of first random mask can be measured and computed by the use of uniform beam to light the input plane of DRPE system.
Optical System and Scheme of Attack on DRPE
The DRPE system [1] can be considered as an optical 4f phase-only filtering system [10] from the view of information optics. The DRPE in Fourier transform domains, which is displayed in the left side of Fig. 1 , is expressed as
where the functions E 1 and E 2 are the distribution of light field at the planes P2 and P3, respectively. The functions sðx ; y Þ and n ðn ¼ 1; 2Þ represent secret image and random phase. The symbol F denotes Fourier operator. The encoding process is a two-step Fourier transform operation. If the optical system with the true phase masks is obtained and controlled by an attacker, the attack tests with various inputs will be available. A point light source placed at the plane P1 is introduced to illuminate the optical DRPE system and is displayed in Fig. 1 . Mathematically, if the impulse function ðx ; y Þ is chosen for addressing the source, the function E 2 ðx 0 ; y 0 Þ becomes
where the amplitude function A 2 can be received by taking the square root of the measured intensity at the plane P3. Here, the phase function 1 has no relevance to the output E 2 except the value 1 ð0; 0Þ. To acquire the phase 2 is needed by an indirect approach. If the field E 2 is measured accurately, the phase 2 will be recovered by an inverse Fourier transform. To reconstruct the distribution of light field ðE 2 Þ, the inline holography technology [11] is a possible choice. The inline holography, however, requires some complex experimental operations, such as reference beam and phase-shifting, for measuring the phase of the field E 2 .
A simple method, which is shown in the right side of Fig. 1 , is designed to obtain the data of the function E 2 . A CCD is shifted along the optical axis and is applied to collect the intensity images I 2;n in the planes J n from the diffraction of the optical field E 2 . The intensity patterns can be addressed with Fresnel diffraction as follows:
where N is the total of the images, and c 0 is constant. The symbol D d n is Fresnel diffraction operator. The parameter d n is the distance from the plane P3 to the plane J n . In particular, the intensity pattern I 2 ð¼ jE 2 j 2 Þ in the plane P3 can be recorded directly by the CCD, which is not used to measure the phase information. Here, the pupil Pu, which is fixed at the plane P3, is used to form a support constraint [13] , [14] in phase retrieval algorithm. The pattern I 2 and its several diffracted intensity images I 2;n are adopted for accelerating the convergence of phase retrieval and guarantee the accuracy of retrieved phase data at the plane P3. From Eq. (3), the precondition of the proposed attack method is that the encryption system is available for this measurement experiment.
An improved iterative amplitude-phase retrieval algorithm [12] in Fresnel domain is used to solve the phase of the complex function E 2 . In Fig. 2 , the parameters 'Àd n ' in Fresnel diffraction are used for the calculation of reverse optical process, namely D Àd n is regarded as an inverse transform operator. Several evaluated distribution patterns of phase in the plane P3 are averaged and expressed as
where the synthesized phase 0 2 is regarded as the updated value k 2 of phase in the next loop. The function "arg" is to extract the phase of input data. After many iterations, the approximate value of complex amplitude E 2 will be retrieved and is annotated asÊ 2 ðx 0 ; y 0 Þ. The second phase 2 can be reconstructed with an inverse Fourier operation aŝ where the function 2 is a relative phase distribution, because the value 1 ð0; 0Þ in Eq. (1) cannot be determined in the method of measurement and calculation. Another reason is that the phase ofÊ 2 is relative due to the phase retrieval algorithm [12] . To our best knowledge, obtaining the true value of the phase 2 is impossible in theory and experiment. Fortunately, the quality of recovered image in DRPE is unaffected for the relative phase 2 . Thereby, the secret image can be decrypted by using the estimated phase 2 . The PLSA is simpler than KPA [8] and CPA [9] , to crack the DRPE system. The point light source, pupil and CCD in Fig. 1 are all elements of the attacking system. The setup of PLSA is placed at the two sides of the optical system of DRPE. The light from the point source travels through the DRPE system and enters into the CCD. The measurement task includes the output of the system and its diffracted patterns. With the recorded data, the parallel iterative phase retrieval algorithm is applied to compute the phase distribution at the output plane of DRPE system. The DRPE can be attacked, after the information of second random phase mask is determined. The experiment complexity of the proposed scheme is lower than CPA [9] . Moreover our method can obtain the high-quality decrypted image. Comparing to KPA [8] , the known plaintext/cipher pair is not required in our scheme, in which only a point source is employed for lighting the input of optical system.
To obtain the information of the first random phase 1 is also possible by illuminating the DRPE system with a uniform beam. Here the phase distribution of the beam at input plane of DRPE system should be known. The field E 2 at the output plane of DRPE system can be measured by taking the method mentioned above. The field sðx ; y Þ in Eq. (1) is retrieved by an inverse Fourier transform twice with the reconstructed complex wavefront at the plane P3. Finally the distribution of complex amplitude at the input plane P1 is recovered and is used to separate the phase 1 .
Numerical Result and Discussion
In the experiment, the input image and random phase matrix are fixed at the size of 256 Â 256 pixels (px). Physically, the width and height of secret image are 0.01 m. The amplitude distribution from output pattern of point light source in the DRPE system is displayed in Fig. 3(a) . A support constraint is added around Fig. 3(a) and is illustrated in Fig. 3(b) , the diffraction patterns of which are recorded at several positions (the planes J 1 ; J 2 ; . . . ; J N ) along the optical axis of the optical system shown in Fig. 1 . The pixel values in the support area (the range marked with the black in Fig. 1 ) are equal to 0. The wavelength of illuminating light is 632.8 nm in calculation. Here, four to six intensity images diffracted from the output plane of DRPE system are selected to be regarded as the reference of input information of the phase retrieval algorithm in Fig. 2 . The values of distance d n are displayed in Table 1 , where the symbol "/" represents that the data is not needed in phase retrieval. The total of iterations K of the phase retrieval algorithm is taken at 1000 for the three cases in Table 1 . The standard deviation of error (STDE) between the true phase 2 and recovered phase K 2 are calculated as
where "std" is to compute the value of standard deviation. The function Á is limited in the range ½0; 2. When STDE equals to 0, the error Á is constant. The reason selecting STDE is that the mean value of the related error in the estimated phase K 2 can be filtered. The corresponding STDE curves are shown in Fig. 4 , where the operation of common logarithm (base 10) is adopted for observing the convergence status of iterations. The curves have three stages: slow, sudden, and stable ranges. The sudden convergence stage will arrive earlier when the 6 intensity images are used for reference data in the phase retrieval algorithm. From Fig. 4 , the STDE arrives at a very small value, which implies that the phase 2 is recovered in high precision. The convergence speed of the phase retrieval algorithm depends on the number N of intensity images recorded outside the output of DRPE system. Fig. 5 shows the error distribution of the phases K 2 and 2 , which are estimated after 1000 iterations with six intensity images. The phase error Á 2 is equal to 2 À 2 . Here the mean values of the two phases are removed because it is ineffective on the quality of decrypted image. The maximum value of relative error of the key phase 2 is less than 1 Â 10 À14 . The mean values of the estimated phase The quality of images retrieved with the evaluated phase 2 is checked by using the proposed attack method. An 8-bit image [15] , i.e., "Baboon," has 256 Â 256 px and is displayed in Fig. 6(a) . The image is encrypted by using DRPE with the value of key phase 2 from the test in Fig. 3 . The case, in which six intensity images of point light source are utilized for the calculation of key phase 2 , is adopted. The numbers of iterations are taken at 180, 185, and 190. The corresponding decrypted images are given in Fig. 6(b)-(d) . The image in Fig. 6(d) , which is almost noise-free, is very close to original image. Therefore, 200 iterations are enough for recovering the secret image when six measured images are employed. This result is superior to the decrypted images reported in [8] and [9] . The mean square error (MSE) curve, which is used to weight the difference between recovered image and original image, is illustrated and marked with blue line in Fig. 6(e) . The trend of the curve is coincident with the red curve in Fig. 4 . The MSE value of decrypted image is less than 0.0259 after 200 iterations of the phase retrieval algorithm shown in Fig. 2. Fig. 6 has demonstrated that the PLSA scheme can crack the DRPE system successfully. Here other decrypted results are shown for validating the universality of the proposed method. With the retrieved phase key obtained after 200 iterations, four images [15] shown in Fig. 7 are employed in decryption test. The values of MSE of the corresponding recovered images are equal to 0.0298, 0.0030, 0.0243, and 0.0165, which indicate that the information of secret images is detected completely. 
